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Twenty-one years ago, after the calamitous Exxon Valdez oil spill (EVOS) in Alaska’s Prince William Sound, the pervasive systemic flaws—that, according 
to the State of Alaska Oil Spill Commission, had made a 
major calamity not just possible but probable1—were largely 
cloaked behind the figure of a captain with a drinking prob-
lem. This time around, after suffering another horrific oil 
incident—this one almost 20 times larger than the Exxon 
Valdez spill2—the question for national energy law and policy 
is whether, this time around, we’ll acknowledge and imple-
ment the hard systemic lessons largely avoided two decades 
ago. The Deepwater Horizon tragedy will be a doubly disas-
trous occasion if it does not produce systemic changes for the 
future, as the Exxon Valdez markedly failed to do. As White 
House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel said in another context, 
“You never want a serious crisis to go to waste.”3
1. See State of Alaska Oil Spill Commission’s Reports and Appendices, February 
1990, available at www.arlis.org/vol2/a/EVOS_FAQs.pdf [hereinafter EVOS 
Commission Report].
2. The Exxon Valdez spill is generally reported as releasing approximately 250,000 
barrels, or 11,000,000 gallons, of crude oil. The April 2010, Deepwater Hori-
zon blowout spill now appears to have released roughly five million barrels, at 
a rate varying between 50-60,000 barrels per day from April 20 until a top cap 
was applied on July 15, 2010.
3. See Gerald F. Seib, In Crisis, Opportunity for Obama, Wall St. J., 
Nov. 21, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/NA_WSJ_
The Barack Obama Administration’s Gulf of Mexico BP 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling Com-
mission, like the Alaska Commission  to set up after the 
Exxon Valdez spill, will try to harvest conclusions about cau-
sation—“why did this calamity happen?”—and about neces-
sary fundamental changes in how we manage the extraction 
and transport of oil for the future. Poised against this cor-
rective agenda is the natural tendency of the industry and 
the communities that depend economically upon it to avert 
systemic changes that potentially will constrain ongoing eco-
nomic activities. As in Alaska, within days of the Gulf of 
Mexico blowout, the industry and its supporters commenced 
defensive political and media initiatives to dilute public per-
ceptions and impacts of the event.4 Meanwhile, legions of 
attorneys have been crowding into courts and agencies stak-
ing claims for billions of dollars in compensation and repara-
tions, just as lawyers jammed flights into Alaska in 1989.
In both their similarities and differences, the Deepwa-
ter Horizon blowout spill and the Exxon Valdez experience 
are instructive. Many of the similarities are frustrating to 
longtime observers. Some of the differences are immensely 
heartening—in some but not all of the Obama Administra-
tion’s words and actions, in potential corrective congressio-
nal legislation, and in belated proposals for wide adoption 
of a 1990 Alaska Commission recommendation for citizen 
watchdog councils.
PUB:SB122721278056345271.html. Given the onrolling current event un-
derlying this present analysis, many citations herein are given to press accounts, 
meanwhile noting that, over time, the factual record will be substantially deep-
ened by historical vetting. See, e.g., Peter Lehner, In Deep Water (2010).
4. Given the current political landscape, it may well also suit the Administration’s 
best interests in public polling to move public attention on to other issues. See 
Michael J. Evans, Oil Spill Pictures and the Media Blackout, BP Oil News, June 
9, 2010, http://bpoilnews.com/oil-spill-pictures/oil-spill-pictures-bp-coverup-
first-amendment/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2010). (“British Petroleum has thrown 
a media blackout over the Gulf Coast, with the apparent complicity of some in 
our federal and local governments.”)
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No oil spill, of course, like no coastal setting, is exactly 
like any other . The stony shores of coastal Alaska are very dif-
ferent from the reedy marshes and beaches of the Gulf Coast 
in ecology and climate .5 The Exxon Valdez oil spill soiled a 
coastal impact zone inhabited by no more than 30,000 peo-
ple, with a sparse economy and only one state jurisdiction 
(and cost Exxon roughly $5 billion) .6 The Gulf of Mexico’s 
affected coastal impact zone is home to nearly 14 million, 
with a complex, marine-oriented economy in five separate 
states, and the defendants’ financial liability is likely to be 
commensurately larger .7
In terms of operational and institutional similarities 
between the EVOS and the Deepwater Horizon spill, many 
regrettably exist . They reflect conditions that were and are all 
too prevalent in the oil production system . Neither spill can 
be dismissed as an anomaly—as a supposed exception that 
proves a general rule of industry care and vigilance .
The Alaska Commission noted multiple areas in the 
“mega-systems” of extracting and transporting oil in which 
the official players, both governmental and corporate, were 
enmeshed in a culture of complacency, collusion, and neglect . 
In applying its lessons 20 years later, systemic analyses of 
issues raised in the public and corporate management of 
these complex systems can be divided into two major sectors: 
Prevention covers issues of safe design, operation, and acci-
dent avoidance before the fact of an oil spill event . Response 
includes the technical quality, practical implementability, 
and readiness of spill response contingency plans and the 
command structure that will put them into effect .
I. Prevention System Failures
The preconditions for destructive discharges lie latent within 
the process of planning, permitting, construction, and 
operation, and in the design of precautionary safeguards . In 
Alaska, the oil spill commission noted that the entire sys-
tem—from the drilling area on the North Slope, through the 
pipeline and Valdez tank farm storage areas, onto the single-
hulled vessels and the transport route down to the refiner-
ies in Long Beach, California—had been developed with 
shortcuts and a primary focus on production rather than 
safety .8 The official state and local regulatory agencies often 
uncritically accepted industry data and assurances on the 
5 . Oiled sandy beaches may be easier to clean than cobbled stone beaches where 
the oil penetrates deeply . Marshes, however, are far more problematic . Warmer 
temperatures can break down oil faster . The winds and currents of the Gulf of 
Mexico are more complex than in the Gulf of Alaska .
6 . The figure is a rough estimate based upon compensatory settlements of $507 .5 
million, twice that amount in punitives after Exxon Shipping v. Baker, 128 S . 
Ct . 2605, 38 ELR 20149 (2008), $30 million in interest, criminal fines of $25 
million, plus $125 million in criminal restitution, $900 million in a civil settle-
ment with Alaska and the United States, and circa $2 .4 billion in remediation 
expenses . Some of these amounts appear to have been covered by insurance or 
offsets . The “reopener” clause was triggered in 2006 by Alaska’s request for an 
additional $92 million for ecological damages . See http://www .arlis .org/docs/
vol1/217276815 .pdf .
7 . Steven G . Wilson & Thomas R . Fischetti, Coastline Population Trends in the 
United States: 1960 to 2008, in Population Estimates and Projections 
2010, at 9 (U .S . Census Bureau, Population Estimates Program Ser . No . P25-
1139 2010) .
8 . See id. at 34-36 .
design and safety of system elements, issued permits without 
required documentation, did not insist on strict compliance 
with corporate and federal rules, and on occasions when 
they attempted to assert regulatory vigilance were resisted, 
delayed, or overturned by the industry’s greater resources 
and political momentum .9 The “revolving door” between 
industry and regulators produced what political scientists 
often describe as “agency capture .”10
The same complacency and inappropriate collusion is 
increasingly revealed in narrative details from the Gulf of 
Mexico oil production structure (with the added element 
of sex) .11 Regulators and regulatees played together in sym-
biotic relationships reflecting the fact that they considered 
themselves part of the same unitary community .12 Deepwa-
ter drilling at unprecedented depths was undertaken with 
casual oversight, with lax requirements for drill plans and 
restricted company disclosure of geological data .13 Cat-
egorical exclusions from full environmental reviews were 
granted for deepwater drilling, and the potential for blow-
outs ignored as virtually impossible, ignoring data showing 
that blowout preventers are prone to failure .14 Monitoring 
and enforcement of regulations were haphazard . If violations 
were assessed, they were vigorously contested to burden and 
deter further enforcement .15
From what we have seen so far from the Gulf of Mexico, 
these preconditions for distress, as in Alaska, were not solely 
prevalent with one company . BP may have been particu-
larly prone to corner-cutting in its dominance of the Aly-
eska management company and in the Gulf of Mexico,16 but 
the comfortable relationships with the U .S . Department of 
the Interior’s Minerals Management Service (MMS) and its 
lax oversight were shared by all the deepwater drilling com-
9 . See id. at 34-59 . When, at the commencement of the pipeline, the state of Alas-
ka passed a protective statute establishing stricter standards for tanker safety 
and pollution avoidance, the industry’s management consortium successfully 
attacked most of the law on preemption grounds . Chevron U .S .A . Inc v . Ham-
mond, 726 F .2d 483, 501, 14 ELR 20305 (9th Cir . 1984) (district court had 
struck down most of the state statute; only a minor appealed part of the statute 
is upheld by the U .S . Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit) .
10 . See Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 
Harv . L . Rev . 1669, 1684-87 (1975) .
11 . Charlie Savage, Sex, Drug Use, and Graft Cited in Interior Department, N .Y . 
Times, Sept . 10, 2008, available at http://www .nytimes .com/2008/09/11/
washington/11royalty .html .
12 . See Jason DeParle, Leading the Way Into Deep Water, N .Y . Times, Aug . 8, 2010, 
at A1, A12-13 . (“Obviously we are all oil industry,” said Larry Williams, the 
[MMS] district manager . “We’re all from the same part of the country . Almost 
all our inspectors have worked for oil companies .   .   .   . They grew up in the 
same towns .”)
13 . See Randy Loftis, Risks of Deep-Water Drilling Get Brush-Off, Anchorage 
Daily News, July 1, 2010, available at http://adn .com/2010/07/01/1349546/
depper-oil-wells-in-gulf-pose .html .
14 . David Barstow et al ., Regulators Failed to Address Risks in Oil Rig Fail-
Safe Device, N .Y . Times, June 20, 2010, available at http://www .nytimes .
com/2010/06/21/us/21blowout .html .
15 . See DeParle, supra note 12 (“A number of agency actions have drawn fire  .  .  . 
[the MMS agency] ignored warnings that crucial pieces of emergency equip-
ment, blowout preventers, were prone to fail .”) .
16 . See Noaki Schwartz, BP Had a Key Role in the Exxon Valdez Disas-
ter, Assoc . Press, May 25, 2010, http://abcnews .go .com/Business/
wireStory?id=10734948 (last visited Sept . 22, 2010) . In the Gulf, there are 
reports that BP had by far the largest number of regulatory violations . Pierre 
Thomas et al ., BP’s Dismal Safety Record, abcnews .go .com, May 27, 2010, 
http://abcnews .go .com/WN/bps-dismal-safety-record/story?id=10763042 
(last visited Sept . 22, 2010) .
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panies . Especially in Louisiana, but to a lesser extent in the 
other Gulf states too, oil is king, and close accommodation 
with the oil industry at the state as well as federal level has 
been standard operating procedure .17
The Alaska Commission made 59 recommendations in 
the wake of the Exxon Valdez, at least one-half of which were 
in whole or part directly relevant to the nation’s oil extraction 
and delivery systems beyond Alaska as well .18 (In the heavy 
industry lobbying that characterized the passage of the Oil 
Pollution Act (OPA) of 199019 through Congress in response 
to the Alaska disaster, many of these recommendations were 
excluded or diluted, with the U .S . Coast Guard and the 
MMS joining the industry in downplaying the commis-
sion’s report .20
Beyond recommendations for a comprehensive preven-
tion policy and general operational safety commitments,21 
the Alaska Oil Spill Commission urged that governmental 
and corporate performance standards specifically require 
best available technology, a fundamentally rational sugges-
tion that could have made a significant difference in the 
Gulf of Mexico, and that enhanced state and local regula-
tory involvement be encouraged rather than preempted .22 
Recommendations at the federal level included calls for seri-
ous unannounced safety drills, mandatory corporate safety 
reporting, mandatory personnel levels, revised insurance 
antitrust exemptions, and an intensified vigilance role for 
the Coast Guard .23 In terms of structural reform, one of the 
Alaska Commission’s most significant recommendations, 
only partially integrated into the OPA, was for the creation 
of institutionalized citizen watchdog councils to break up 
the tendencies toward complacency, collusion, and neglect 
within the di-polar industry-regulatory agency management 
model that has characterized the field .24
The emerging history of Gulf of Mexico deepwater drill-
ing frustratingly reflects how beneficial it might have been for 
those Alaskan recommendations to have been implemented 
nationally in the wake of the Exxon Valdez .
17 . It has been difficult to criticize the oil industry . After Hurricane Katrina, it was 
apparent to most coastal scientists that a major contributor to inland flooding 
and the destruction of buffering coastal marshes was the 8,000 miles of oil 
industry canals cut through coastal marshes to serve drilling operations, but 
this fact was generally not mentioned .
18 . EVOS Commission Report . The Recommendations are spelled out at length 
in pages 129-71 of the report .
19 . 33 U .S .C . §§2701-2761, ELR Stat . OPA §§1001-7001 .
20 . “The Oil Spill Commission report was not accepted by the Coast Guard or 
MMS .  .   .   . The Coast Guard opposed the Commission before the Congress 
on many matters in 1990 during passage of OPA-90 .” E-mail from Chairman 
Walter Parker, oral history comment, Answers to 3 Questions, Aug . 4, 2010 
[on file with author] .
21 . EVOS Commission Report, supra note 1, Recommendations 1-6 .
22 . EVOS Commission Report, supra note 1, Recommendations 13-18, 26-27 . 
Congressional intent not to preempt state and local regulatory action would 
avoid the industry arguments that undercut Alaska’s protective regulations in 
Hammond, 726 F .2d 483, supra note 9 . The Commission also noted the par-
ticular utility of interstate compacts . EVOS Commission Report, supra note 1, 
Recommendation 18 .
23 . EVOS Commission Report, supra note 1, Recommendations 30-33 .
24 . EVOS Commission Report, supra note 1, Recommendations 3, 12, 26-27 . See 
further discussion infra note 52 and accompanying text .
II. Response System Failures
The two disasters, two decades apart, reveal distressingly 
similar systemic failures in response preparation and imple-
mentation . Contingency plans are the heart of response 
effectiveness, and in both cases, the official contingency 
plans were largely fiction . BP’s Gulf of Mexico plan notori-
ously included consideration of walruses, not found south of 
Seattle, as well as minimizing the possibility of a blowout 
and wildly exaggerating the practicability of discharge cap-
ture and cleanup .25 There was no demonstrated technology 
for capturing a large blowout or a blowout at mile depths, 
despite 30 years of knowledge of the threat since Ixtoc in 
1979 . The official Alaska plan had failed within 48 hours; 
a generic default Exxon corporate plan had to be brought 
in .26 Twenty-one years later, the command structure in the 
Gulf of Mexico was uncertain, with state and federal repre-
sentatives stepping on one another’s toes and BP not under 
their control .27
The Alaska Commission focused on the need for design-
ing and implementing a decisive unified incident com-
mand, a call that the OPA’s national contingency plan in 
practice essentially avoided . In addition to asserting the 
need for governmental command authority over industry 
equipment and personnel, the commission called for shift-
ing oil spill containment and cleanup responsibilities to the 
U .S . Army Corps of Engineers if the Coast Guard proved 
incapable of asserting stronger command authority,28 and 
criticized the U .S . Environmental Protection Agency’s 
(EPA’s) lack of regulatory energy in spill prevention and 
response .29 EPA’s continued failure to scrutinize and regu-
late dispersants has been a critical element in the shortcom-
ings of national spill response .30
Indeed, perhaps the most significant indicator of dysfunc-
tional response mechanisms, despite dire warnings from the 
Alaska Commission 20 years previously, was the vigorous 
and indiscriminate propensity to use dispersants .
25 . Reuters, Walruses in Louisiana? Eyebrow-Raising Details of BP’s Spill Response 
Plan, May 27, 2010, http://blogs .reuters .com/environment/2010/05/walrus-
es-in-louisiana-eyebrow-raising-details-of-bps-spill-response-plan/ (last visited 
Sept . 22, 2010) .
26 . EVOS Commission Report, supra note 1, at 161; see also EVOS Commission 
Report, supra note 1, app . N, Day 2 and Day 3, available at http://www .arlis .
org/docs/vol1/B/26006063/26006063N .pdf .
27 . EVOS Commission Report, supra note 1, Recommendation 48 (“Incident 
Command System—A formal command structure known as the Incident 
Command System should be used to direct response to oil spills .  .  .  .”), Rec-
ommendation 38 (“Government in charge—The spiller should not be in 
charge of response to a major spill . A spiller should be obligated to respond 
with all the resources it can summon, but government should command that 
response .   .   .   .”) . In contingency plans, industry equipment and funding are 
typically central . As the Alaska Commission noted, command must be gov-
ernmental, yet when the U .S . Coast Guard command ordered BP to stop 
using dispersants, BP demurred . David A . Fahrenthold & Steven Mufson, 
Documents Indicate Heavy Use of Dispersants in Gulf Oil Spill, Wash . Post, 
Aug . 1, 2010, available at http://www .washingtonpost .com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2010/07/31/AR2010073102381 .html .
28 . EVOS Commission Report, supra note 1, Recommendation 39 .
29 . EVOS Commission Report, supra note 1, Recommendation 40 .
30 . The necessity and shortcomings of EPA’s scrutiny of dispersants are analyzed at 
length in Dr . Riki Ott’s major compilation of post-EVOS accounting, Sound 
Truths and Corporate Myths: The Legacy of the Exxon Valdez Oil 
Spill (2005) .
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“Dispersant,” as the repercussions of Deepwater Hori-
zon continue, is a previously-unfamiliar word that may 
well achieve the same kind of public notoriety as the once-
unknown “chad .” Dispersants were targeted by the Alaska 
Commission as deeply problematic,31 but are strongly favored 
by industry for a variety of salient reasons . Dispersants are 
cheaper to the spiller than removal actions . Perhaps even more 
compelling, dispersants are “optically” preferable: they play a 
key role in the canonic “out-of-sight, out-of-mind” response 
strategy . If oil can be sunk beneath the surface and broken up 
into billions of small suspended droplets, it becomes invis-
ible, lessens the images of fouled beaches and dying wildlife, 
and its existence can be doubted and denied .32 By discharg-
ing a torrent of dispersants a mile below the surface right at 
the blowout wellhead spew point, the objective is to prevent 
much of the oil from ever reaching visibility at the surface . If 
oil reaches beaches, dispersants can, to some extent, achieve 
surface cleaning . In Alaska, images of high-pressure spraying 
of dispersants on stony beaches were a major objective for 
Exxon in creating news video of successful post-spill cleanup .
But dispersants have serious destructive effects when 
released into the environment, and not just for wildlife . In 
Alaska, temporary workers hired to spray dispersants on 
Prince William Sound and on the beaches reported a litany of 
physical effects from exposure to backspray .33 “We’re peeing 
blood,” the author was told . “If it’s doing this to us, what’s it 
doing to the places we’re spraying?!” In Alaska today, beaches 
that had been sprayed with dispersants reportedly demon-
strate greater continued ecological damage than beaches that 
were never “cleaned .”34 Down on the Gulf, there are not only 
reports of dolphins dying with hemorrhages around their 
blowholes and in their internal organs, but dispersant work-
ers have also started to pass blood in their urine, and children 
and adults in coastal communities are reporting some of the 
same breathing illnesses and blood effects that were experi-
enced in Alaska .35
Dispersants in the water column not only kill marine 
mammals, fish, and other larger life forms, but may have 
even greater long-term ecosystem effects . The Deepwater 
Horizon blowout occurred at the Gulf of Mexico’s season 
of maximum larval production for fish, shellfish, and the 
myriad smaller life forms that support the fecundity of the 
Gulf . Dispersants make the oil miscible, hanging in sub-
surface curtain plumes of tiny droplets of heavy oil-cum-
dispersant that can directly contaminate or be consumed by 
whatever it touches . “Clouds of larva, billions, even trillions 
31 . EVOS Commission Report, supra note 1, at 198-99 .
32 . Matthew Brown, Underwater Oil Plumes Disputed by BP CEO Tony Hay-
ward, Huffington Post, May 10, 2010, http://www .huffingtonpost .
com/2010/05/30/underwater-oil-plumes-dis_n_595015 .html (last visited 
Sept . 22, 2010) .
33 . See Ott, supra note 30, at 20-71 .
34 . Personal Communication from Dr . Ott in Louisiana, Aug . 9, 2010 .
35 . Id. See Project Gulf Impact, From the Gulf Stream to the Bloodstream, 
http://theintelhub .com/2010/09/05/from-the-gulf-stream-to-the-blood-
stream/ (Sept . 5, 2010), (and video footage: http://www .youtube .com/
watch?v=6drasiXNFaw) (volatile solvents profile analyses on airborne 
chemicals in the bodies of Gulf coastal residents—isooctane, hexane, 
methylpentanes, ethylbenzene, m .p .-xylene—apparently deriving from 
oil-dispersant effects) .
of them, are drifting in that water column,” a federal biolo-
gist told the author . “They move up and down according to 
temperature and light, and when they hit those plumes of 
suspended subsurface oil, it’s all over for them .”36 The genetic 
damage to ecosystems in Alaska is still tangible . Herring 
populations and that major Alaska fishery have never recov-
ered, and Prince William Sound’s primary pod of orca killer 
whales has not had a successful reproduction since the spill .37 
If the Alaska Commission’s recommendations had been 
heeded, it is likely that dispersants would play no part or a 
significantly reduced role in spill response, instead focusing 
national response on adoption of advanced skimmer oil-cap-
ture technology,38 nontoxic coagulants that can operate in 
the subsurface water column as well as on the surface, high-
volume separation and retrieval systems, and even short-term 
combustion approaches, in addition to greatly enhanced pre-
vention . But it was not to be .
Today, as EPA has belatedly hastened to test an array of 
dispersants, the Agency’s tentative conclusions about disper-
sant toxicity are cast into grave doubt by the Alaska expe-
rience . Those dispersants that have been tested appear in 
most cases to have been subjected only to short-term, high-
dose acute toxicity tests of the dispersant alone, rather than 
doing the normal range of tests for toxicity, capabilities, and 
efficacy,39 with insufficient testing of realistic dispersant-oil 
mixtures, and typically focusing only on short-term toxicity 
to humans, not on broad ecological toxicity effects .40
III. Dissimilarities, Positive and Negative
Twenty-one years after the Alaska spill, some elements of 
the societal response to the Deepwater Horizon blowout 
spill are potentially quite different . The concept of natural 
36 . Personal Communication from federal biologist in Florida, June 2010 .
37 . Brandon Keim, Unique Killer-Whale Pod Doomed by Exxon Valdez, wired .
com, Mar . 24, 2009, http://www .wired .com/wiredscience/2009/03/valdez-
whales/ (last visited Sept . 22, 2010) .
38 . Some scientists have argued that it is preferable and less damaging to keep the 
oil on the water’s surface . If oil stays on the surface, rather than mixing deep in 
the water column, it is retrievable by the kind of effective surface technology 
currently used in Europe; if submerged by dispersants, it is not .
39 . As EPA noted in its 1999 HPV Chemical Hazard Data Availability Study, “[t]
here are six basic tests which have been internationally agreed to for screening 
high production volume (HPV) chemicals for toxicity . The tests agreed to un-
der the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Screen-
ing Information Data Set (OECD/SIDS) program are: acute toxicity; chronic 
toxicity; developmental/reproductive toxicity; mutagenicity; ecotoxicity; and 
environmental fate .” EPA, HPV Chemical Hazard Data Availability Study, 
http://www .epa .gov/hpv/pubs/general/hazchem .htm . Testing that uses only 
acute toxicity parameters does not give reliable data on real- world toxicity .
40 . In Alaska, research post-EVOS demonstrated that the mixture of crude oil and 
dispersant is more toxic than either the dispersant or crude oil by themselves . 
Robert A . Perkins et al ., Comparative Marine Toxicity Testing: A Cold-Water 
Species and Standard Warm-Water Test Species Exposed to Crude Oil and Disper-
sant, 42 Cold Regions Sci . & Tech . 226 (2005) . Low-dose exposures can be 
very dangerous . See Nicholas A . Ashford & Claudia S . Miller, Chemical 
Exposures: Low Levels and High Stakes (1998) . As to humans, “[e]ven 
moderate chemical exposure was  .  .  . associated with a greater reported preva-
lence of chronic airway disease and symptoms of multiple chemical sensitivity .” 
Annie K . O’Neill, Self-Reported Exposures and Health Status Among 
Workers From the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Cleanup (MPH thesis, 2001; 
http://rikiott .com/pdf/oneill_thesis .pdf ) . Cf. National Research Council, 
Committee on Understanding Oil Spill Dispersants, Oil Spill Disper-
sants: Efficacy and Effects (2005) .
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resource damages was barely known in 1990,41 and the same 
for “ecosystem services,” the significant resource economics 
concept of accounting a shadow-priced cash value for the 
uncompensated economic values provided to human econo-
mies by, for example, marshlands’ water filtration and flood 
prevention that are normally taken for granted but can pose 
total impacts of hundreds of billions of dollars if lost .42 The 
existence today of solid economic arguments for ecosystem 
services means that the treatment of ecological damages has 
potentially evolved from charming aesthetic arguments to 
hard-cash realities .
The Obama Administration can be credited with hearten-
ing and unprecedented responsive improvements, as well as 
distressing echoes of past political dysfunctions . The sophis-
tication of the industry’s defensive informational campaign, 
however, is likely to be far greater than 21 years ago . In the 
Exxon Valdez setting, the federal executive maintained a low 
profile . President George H .W . Bush did not fly to Alaska, 
and he specifically abjured federal responsibility .43 Exxon 
managed the response initiatives . No federal review com-
mission was appointed . Only narrowly was the U .S . Depart-
ment of Justice prevented from settling the criminal liability 
actions without major penalties .44 Twenty-one years ago, 
however, the press and congressional politicians took virtu-
ally no critical notice of the lack of presidential attention .
In contrast, the Obama White House has produced a 
series of remarkable interventions . One innovation is the $20 
billion compensation fund to be administered by Kenneth 
Feinberg who managed the post-9-11 fund .45 The need for 
rapid access to massive amounts of sustaining compensa-
tion payments was clear, but no obvious federal law existed 
to support creation of such a fund .46 By jawboning BP 
41 . Cf. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill: Update of NOAA NRDA Activities, http://www .darrp .
noaa .gov/http://www .darrp .noaa .gov/ (June 2010) .
42 . See Robert Costanza & Herman E . Daly, Natural Capital and Sustainable 
Development, 6 Conserv . Bio . 37-46 (Mar . 1992); Paul Hawken, Natural 
Capitalism, Mother Jones, Mar .-Apr . 1997, at 40 . There is a strong body of 
law review scholarship on ecosystem services . See Gretchen Daily, Nature’s 
Services: Societal Dependence on Natural Ecosystems (G .C . Daily ed ., 
1997); J .B . Ruhl & James Salzman, The Law and Policy Beginnings of Ecosystem 
Services, 22 J . Land Use & Envtl . L . 157 (2007); J .B . Ruhl, Toward a Com-
mon Law of Ecosystem Services, 18 St . Thomas L . Rev . 1 (2005); James Salz-
man et al ., Protecting Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics, and Law, 20 Stan . 
Envtl . L .J . 309 (2001) .
43 . See Fareed Zakaria, Presidential Pony Show, Newsweek, June 13, 2010, avail-
able at http://www .newsweek .com/2010/06/13/presidential-pony-show .html . 
President Bush’s Transportation Secretary, Samuel Skinner, declared that direct 
federal government involvement would be “counterproductive,” http://www .
newsweek .com/2010/06/13/presidential-pony-show .html .
44 . Personal Communication from Dr . Rick Steiner, University of Alaska, who was 
instrumental in blowing that whistle, June 2, 2010, telephone conversation .
45 . See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Administering Fund, a Master Mediator, N .Y . Times, 
June 17, 2010, at A18, http:// www .nytimes .com/2010/06/17/us/17feinberg .
html (last visited Sept . 22, 2010 .
46 . Like others, the author hypothesized a mega-lien on BP assets, and Boston 
College Law School colleague Brian Quinn discovered a means to assess very 
large supplemental bonding requirements to cover late-arising environmental 
hazards . See U .S . Department of the Interior, Notice to Lessees and Operators 
of Federal Oil, Gas, and Sulphur Leases in the Outer Continental Shelf, Gulf 
of Mexico OCS Region, NTL No . 2000-G16, effective date: Sept . 7, 2000, 
http://www .gomr .mms .gov/homepg/regulate/regs/ntls/ntl00-g16 .html; Leas-
ing of Sulphur or Oil and Gas in the Outer Continental Shelf, 30 C .F .R . pt . 
256, Subpart I (1997, amended 2001) . Neither of these avenues, however, 
appeared to allow timely payment of victim compensation .
Chairman Carl-Henric Svanburg into a negotiated contract 
to post such a huge fund (with the help of 52 Democratic 
senators), President Obama created a legal animal that had 
never before existed, neither corporate nor governmental,47 
neither foreclosing recovery outside the fund48 nor holding 
funded payments to single payouts, bypassing the techni-
cal requirements and burdens of litigation victims otherwise 
would dauntingly face .49 The oiled communities of Alaska 
had requested a similar innovation and would have rejoiced 
at anything resembling the Obama-Svanburg fund, but no 
such thing ever approached reality . In addition, the Obama 
Administration persuaded BP to create a likewise unprec-
edented $100 million foundation grant to offer interim sup-
port to unemployed oil workers, and a $500 million Gulf of 
Mexico Research Initiative fund monitoring human health 
and environmental effects .50 While lingering health effects 
still plague local coastal communities in Alaska, the latter 
fund possesses dramatic potential to change the medical 
and informational opacity experienced after the Exxon Val-
dez spill .
The Obama Administration has split up the MMS into 
three separate entities, including a Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Management Regulation, and Enforcement,51 and created a 
presidential oil spill commission (which remains a work in 
progress, and has expressly sought input from the experiences 
of the Alaska Commission) . Following the recommendations 
of its Ocean Policy Task Force, which proposed the establish-
ment of a national policy for the stewardship of the ocean, 
coasts, and Great Lakes, the Administration has initiated a 
National Ocean Council .52 The Administration’s attention to 
coastal risk management also expressly includes the Arctic,53 
where oil companies have sought to press ahead with offshore 
47 . The fund has been organized in the form of a trust under the laws of Del-
aware . See Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust, http://www .citizen .org/
documents/2010-8-9TrustAgreement .pdf . Some details of the fund’s trust de-
sign have raised worries from progressives . See Tyson Slocum, Concerns With 
the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust (Public Citizen, Aug . 12, 2010), http://
www .citizen .org/documents/BP-Trust-Public-Citizen-Concerns .pdf .
48 . Double recovery for the same harms would, of course, be forestalled, but at this 
date, it appears that a claimant could petition for fund recovery for one discrete 
class of harms suffered—for instance emergency claims from the emergency 
fund program—while preserving other legal avenues for other classes of harms, 
or claims against defendants other than BP . Harry Weber, Gulf Claims Chief 
Feinberg Says No-Sue Rule Was His Idea, Not BP’s, Assoc . Press, Aug . 24, 2010, 
available at http://abcnews .go .com/Business/wireStory?id=11456413 . This 
situation could be substantially modified, however, by contract terms imposed 
by the administrators of the fund . Id.
49 . For more on the fund, see Frederic J . Frommer, Feinberg Sells Compensation 
Fund to Spill Victims, Assoc . Press, July 19, 2010, available at http://seattle-
times .nwsource .com/html/businesstechnology/2012394546_apusgulfoilspill-
feinberg .html .
50 . See White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Claims and Escrow Fact Sheet, 
June 16, 2010, available at http://www .whitehouse .gov/the-press-office/
fact-sheet-claims-and-escrow .
51 . Press Release, BOEMRE, Secretarial Order Begins Reorganization of Former 
MMS (June 21, 2010), available at http://www .boemre .gov/ooc/press/2010/
press0621 .htm.
52 . Julie Pace, Obama Launches New National Policy to Strengthen Management of 
Oceans, Assoc . Press, July 19, 2010, available at http://www .washingtonex-
aminer .com/politics/ap/obama-launches-new-national-policy-to-strengthen-
management-of-oceans-98771294 .html .
53 . Jim Carlton, Bill Includes Citizens Oil Panel for Gulf, Arctic Coasts, Wall St . J ., 
Aug . 2, 2010, available at http://online .wsj .com/article/SB100014240527487
03292704575393492820269842 .html .
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drilling, despite the extraordinary hazards of prevention and 
response in such a setting .
The Administration has also joined long-delayed con-
gressional efforts to bring the Alaska innovation of indus-
try-financed but independent citizen watchdog counsels to 
national coastal application . Building upon a suggestion by 
Prof . Rick Steiner of the University of Alaska, the Exxon Val-
dez commission proposed that area sectors of the oil industry 
be required to fund independent watchdog citizen oversight 
councils with fact-finding powers to scrutinize the corpo-
rate-agency management of the oil extraction and transport 
system . In the congressional lobbying during the passage 
of the OPA, the concept was made into law in the form of 
regional citizen advisory councils (RCACs), but they were 
restricted to Alaska waters and denied the subpoena power 
the Alaska Commission had proposed .54 Nevertheless, the 
Alaska RCACs have created a remarkable third force coun-
terbalancing the di-polar industry-agency axis .55 Council 
members represent commercial and recreational fishermen, 
local communities, and otherwise unrepresented groups who 
would themselves suffer the negative consequences of system 
breakdowns . The citizen councils’ power to collect and dis-
seminate sensitive relevant information, including receiving 
and communicating whistleblower leaks, has changed the 
topography of the oil extraction and transport system in 
Alaska . If one or more RCAC had been authorized for the 
Gulf of Mexico with subpoena power, it seems inconceivable 
to Alaskan observers, given their experience with RCACs, 
that the Deepwater Horizon well would have been permitted 
without full environmental review or a competent real-life 
contingency plan, never mind that it lacked worst-case analy-
sis and had no blowout response plan . The Obama White 
House and congressional drafters are currently considering 
an RCAC provision for the Gulf and other coastal waters .56 
Integrating the RCAC form into the oil extraction and trans-
portation megasystem is innovative in political theory terms 
as well as functionality . It institutionalizes a vigilant third 
perspective into the traditional di-polar industry-agency gov-
ernance model, converting it into a multicentric pluralism .
IV. Will We Learn?
Inheriting a dysfunctional status quo, the Administration 
appears to have taken fundamentally rational but unprec-
edented steps to begin addressing systemic needs for reform . 
For undertaking this array of initiatives, President Obama 
54 . 33 U .S .C .S . §2732(d) (OPA §5002(d)) (1990) .
55 . What I call the old “di-polar” model of societal governance involves, on the 
one hand, the market dynamo that drives our economy generating invention, 
wealth, jobs, culture, as well as negative externalities like pollution—and on 
the other, government agencies holding the role and responsibility of counter-
balancing the excesses of the marketplace economy . Adding a third leg shifts 
the governmental geometry toward a Jeffersonian multicentric pluralism, 
where previously marginalized affected interests are able to be actively involved 
in the governance process . The new triangulation created by the RCACs and 
other third-party empowerments helps to avoid public and individual values 
getting lost in the tangles of the traditionally insulated di-polar political-eco-
nomic marketplace . I think I adapted this rubric from a phrase used by Prof . 
Lon Fuller in a slightly different context .
56 . See Carlton, supra note 53 .
appears mainly to have opened up a harvest of criticism from 
both left and right, complaining that more should have been 
done . The possible omissions and commissions of the preced-
ing Administration in cosseting the perilously risky deepwa-
ter regime seem to have gone virtually unnoted .57
“Optics” provide another fundamental difference between 
the EVOS setting and the BP blowout . While the Exxon 
Valdez’s Capt . Joseph Hazelwood indisputably had a drink-
ing problem and had had several drinks during the layover 
in Valdez,58 the Alaska Commission attributed the spill 
to systemic shortcuts that meant that the ship’s crew was 
understaffed and lacking in sufficient sleep, as well as other 
laxities not attributable to the captain .59 It served the inter-
ests of all parties, however, to simplify the causation issue, 
narrowing it to the captain’s consumption of several pre-
embarkation vodkas .
No such reductionism is possible in the Deepwater Hori-
zon calamity . The blowout was clearly caused by systemic 
failures, starting from the initiation of the well through the 
ultimate failures to perceive and correct imminent safety 
hazard conditions . The greater visibility of causative condi-
tions means that responsive corrective actions in the 2010 
setting are likely to address the kinds of systemic flaws that 
were obscured in the 1989 incident .
There are less promising dissimilarities as well, however . 
In the 20 years since the Exxon Valdez, the technology of 
media spin control has grown exponentially in sophistica-
tion, and the political setting has drifted farther from con-
cern with science and fact as congressional polarization has 
increased . According to Alaska RCAC members reporting 
from the Gulf, BP has been far more successful than Exxon 
in removing dead and dying oiled wildlife from visibility on 
the coast, in managing medical reports on workers exposed 
to dispersants, and managing the press . BP is effectively sup-
ported by other companies and dependent coastal commu-
nities in asserting the exceptional status of the Deepwater 
Horizon blowout, the need to press on with deepwater drill-
ing, and the reasonableness of risks being managed in the 
Gulf . The Obama Administration, perhaps eager to show 
progress in meeting the strident expectations of critics, has 
reportedly denied access to photographers seeking images of 
dead and dying wildlife,60 has affirmed BP assertions that a 
57 . The only direct linkage between the Dick Cheney-Bush policies of deregulato-
ry encouragement and the Deepwater Horizon blowout derives from the secret 
Cheney energy policy advisory group, and originated from a United Kingdom 
report: Michael Tomasky, Dick Cheney and the Oil Spill, The Guardian, May 
3, 2010, http://www .guardian .co .uk/commentisfree/michaeltomasky/2010/
may/03/usa-dickcheney (last visited Sept . 22, 2010) .
58 . National Transportation Safety Board, Factual Report-Toxicology, Mar . 24, 
1989 . A blood sample was taken aboard the vessel from Exxon Valdez Captain 
Hazelwood . Later, laboratory testing showed a presence of ethanol percentage 
of  .061, but no presence of drugs . Tests at another laboratory showed an etha-
nol percentage of  .06 percent . EVOS Commission Report, supra note 1, app . 
N, at 48 .
59 . EVOS Commission Report, supra note 1, at 149-54 . According to one expla-
nation, he had left the bridge, not to sleep off alcohol, but to do work that 
should normally have been done by absent crew . See, e.g., EVOS Commission 
Report, supra note 1, app . N, at 16 .
60 . The reason given for restricted access, apparently, has been to prevent taint-
ing of potential prosecutorial evidence . In Alaska, the federal government 
incinerated all collected oiled fauna as soon as a settlement with Exxon was 
Copyright © 2010 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
11-2010 NEWS & ANALYSIS 40 ELR 11047
large majority of discharged oil has been recaptured, a claim 
vigorously disputed by observers,61 and has reopened areas 
to fishing that appear clean to the surface eye but contain 
plumes of subsurface oil .62 At a time when increased vigi-
lance and skepticism would seem necessary, it is troubling to 
see federal officials downplaying continuing health, safety, 
and ecological conditions .
Vivid disasters create practical possibilities for systemic 
improvement, but only if systemic flaws are publicly per-
ceived and systemic lessons learned . The Exxon Valdez oil 
spill in 1989 and the State of Alaska Oil Spill Commission 
Report of 1990 distilled some highly significant perceptions 
and recommendations for systemic improvements, but many 
did not translate into the federal OPA legislation passed in 
response to the public dismay at the Alaska calamity . Those 
that did tended to become suborned by the culture of com-
placency, collusion, and neglect that the Alaska Commission 
had identified as the precondition and cause of that disaster 
and the subsequent failures in cleanup and response . Now, 
the Deepwater Horizon blowout presents another oppor-
tunity to learn from disaster . Similarities and differences 
between the two crises reflect hopeful and less-hopeful indi-
cations that, this time around, hard lessons will be learned .
signed, to the frustration of ecologists seeking to research toxicity in wildlife 
and of litigants who wanted evidence on natural resource contamination in 
several settings .
61 . Christine Dell’Amore, New U.S. Gulf Oil Spill Report Called “Ludicrous,” Much 
Gulf Oil Remains, Deeply Hidden and Under Beaches, Nat’l Geographic News, 
(Aug . 5, 2010), http://news .nationalgeographic .com/news/2010/08/100805-
gulf-oil-spill-cement-static-kill-bp-science-environment/ (last visited Sept . 22, 
2010) .
62 . Fishermen in re-opened “cleaned” areas have been dragging up samples of 
thick oil concentrations from below the surface . Dahr Jamail & Erika Blumen-
feld, Despite "All Clear," Mississippi Sound Tests Positive for Oil, Truthout Report 
(Aug . 29, 2010), http://www .truth-out .org/mississippi-sound-tests-positive-
oil62735 (last visited Sept . 30, 2010) .
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